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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under section 78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code 
(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE # 1: Whether the trial court properly ruled that a deed of trust signed 
by the owner of the real property is not "a wrongful lien" under Utah Code 
Annotated §38-9-1(6). 
ISSUE #2: Whether the trial court committed error by failing to summarily 
nullify a deed of trust the petitioner admittedly signed. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §§38-9-1 - 38-9-7 ("Wrongful Lien Act"). [Attached as 
Addendum "C" to Appellant's Brief.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In exchange for its agreement to loan substantial amounts of money in 
connection with a real estate development in Midway, Utah, Appellee Wilshire 
Investments, L.L.C. ("Wilshire") required and received security for its loan in the 
form of trust deeds on the property comprising the development. A material part of 
that security was a trust deed (the "Trust Deed" or the "Deed of Trust") on property 
(the "Anderson Property") owned by Appellants R. Michael Anderson and Robert H. 
3 
Anderson (collectively the "Andersons"). The Andersons granted Wilshire a lien in 
the Anderson Property in the form of the Trust Deed, and Wilshire properly and 
legally recorded its lien on the Anderson Property. 
On May 1, 2002, the Andersons filed, pursuant to U.C.A. §38-9-7, a Petition 
for Removal of Wrongful Lien (the "Petition") in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Wasatch County, State of Utah, claiming that their grant of the Trust Deed to 
Wilshire meant nothing - that "Respondent represented to the Andersons that if they 
provided a Deed of Trust to Respondent it would never foreclose on the Andersons' 
property." [R. at 28 (Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Removal 
of Wrongful Lien at p. 1).] The Andersons claimed in their Petition that when 
Wilshire recorded the Trust Deed, Wilshire created a wrongful lien on the Anderson 
Property. Wilshire responded to the Andersons' assertions by demonstrating to the 
trial court that Wilshire had loaned substantial amounts of money in connection with 
a development that includes the Property, and the Trust Deed that the Andersons 
specifically granted to Wilshire to help secure Wilshire's loans was an integral and 
material part of the loan transaction. 
On May 8, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Andersons' 
Petition. After carefully reviewing the issue, the trial court concluded that because 
the Andersons' indisputably signed the Trust Deed it could not constitute a "wrongful 
lien" as that term is defined under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act (the "Act"). 
Section 38-9-1(6), which defines the term "wrongful lien," provides in 
relevant part: 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a 
lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and 
at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
* * * 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property." 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). 
The trial court held that because the Andersons admited that they signed the 
Trust Deed, Wilshire's lien on the Anderson Property was not wrongful. 
Accordingly, the trial court refused to summarily nullify Wilshire's lien and 
dismissed the Andersons' Petition concluding that pursuant to the express terms of 
the Act, "[a] summary proceeding under this section [such as that brought by the 
Andersons] is only to determine whether or not a document is a wrongful lien." Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). 
The Andersons requested a hearing on their Petition for Wrongful Lien 
seven days after they filed their Petition. This appeal is about whether Judge Eyre 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court correctly denied the Andersons' request for 
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summary nullification of the lien at issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7. See 
R. at 1-11 (Andersons' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien Pursuant to U.C.A. §38-
9-7). Contrary to the Andersons' assertion, this appeal is not about which party 
ultimately will or should prevail on the merits of the Andersons' claim that 
Wilshire purportedly improperly filed and/or refused to release a deed of trust on 
property owned by the Andersons. Judge Eyre plainly made the correct ruling 
given the undisputed facts before him. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Andersons set forth a statement of "facts" virtually identical to those set 
forth to the trial court. Many - indeed, most - of those "facts," which in large part 
are irrelevant to the issues before this Court, are vigorously contested and disputed 
by Wilshire. Moreover, many of the "facts" the Andersons assert and the 
conclusions they draw from purported "facts" are patently contrary to the relevant 
transaction documents, including documents signed by the Andersons. 
Furthermore, because the proceeding before the trial court was an expedited 
proceeding, Wilshire was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to respond 
directly to the Andersons' factual assertions and, therefore, no response was 
provided under the expedited circumstances. Rather, Wilshire set forth its own 
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statement of the facts that established that the lien at issue was not wrongful and 
should not be summarily removed. 
The Andersons did not dispute the material facts that Wilshire presented to 
the trial court and, in fact, admitted that they had signed the trust deed creating the 
lien at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Andersons' assertion that their 
statement of facts were not contested by Wilshire and therefore deemed admitted is 
incorrect. The facts that the Andersons set forth were not material to the issues 
before the trial court and are not relevant to the specific issues on appeal to this 
Court. 
In support of its Response to the Andersons' Petition, Wilshire set forth 
several numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 127-134.] The Andersons 
did not dispute any of Wilshire's facts. The same facts are set forth herein, in 
relevant part, with citations to the record. 
1. Wilshire Investments, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, is a 
business with offices in Holladay, Utah, that specializes in making secured, short-
term commercial "bridge" loans. [R. at 148] 
2. In late July of 2001, Wilshire was approached by Bruce Mabey, a 
commercial loan broker representing David Turcotte, Brent Woodson and Springs 
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of St. Moritz Resorts, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("Springs"), in 
connection with a possible bridge loan from Wilshire to Springs. [Id. at 147.] 
3. Contrary to assertions made and implied in the Petition filed by the 
Andersons in this matter, neither Mr. Mabey, Mr. Turcotte, Mr. Woodson nor 
Springs is a manager, member, officer or other affiliate of Wilshire. [Id.] 
4. Springs desired to borrow approximately $3.5 million to $5 million 
from Wilshire and indicated to Wilshire that it could "post" as collateral two 
parcels of undeveloped real property in Midway, Utah - (1) a parcel of 
approximately 20 acres known as the "Johnson Property," which Springs would 
acquire with a portion of the loan proceeds (the "Johnson Property"), and (2) an 
adjoining parcel known as the "Anderson Property," which is the subject of the 
Petition. [Id.] 
5. Upon reviewing the materials presented to it regarding the proposed 
loan and collateral, Wilshire indicated to Springs that in order to fund the desired 
amount, it would need additional collateral. Springs then proposed that certain 
property owned by the Jay Hulet family in Idaho (the "Hulet Property") could be 
mortgaged to Wilshire as the additional collateral. [Id.] 
6. Wilshire assumed that Springs and/or its principals had entered (or 
would enter) into contractual arrangements with the Andersons and the owners of 
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the Hulet Property, respectively, regarding the posting of the Anderson Property 
and the Hulet Property as collateral for the loan from Wilshire to Springs. It was 
no concern of Wilshire's what these arrangements were so long as the 
arrangements did not threaten the ability of Springs to repay the loan. 
Accordingly, Wilshire did not inquire of Springs or its principals regarding the 
nature of these arrangements or even whether or not they had been consummated. 
Wilshire was satisfied at that point with the representations of Springs that the 
proposed collateral would in fact be liened as security for the proposed loan. [Id. 
at 146-47.] 
7. Based on the representations made by Springs and its representatives, 
Wilshire directed its counsel to prepare loan documents to be executed in the event 
Wilshire funded a loan to Springs. At no time did Wilshire ever commit to or 
agree with Springs or any other party that it would fund any loan to Springs for a 
certain amount or at all. Wilshire merely indicated its interest in funding a loan 
based on the proposed terms secured by the proposed collateral. [Id. at 146.] 
8. On August 10, 2001, Springs and its principals executed and delivered 
to Wilshire, among other things, the following loan documents: (a) a promissory 
note in favor of Wilshire in the original principal amount of $4,953,000 (the 
"Note"), (b) a trust deed securing the Note and covering the Johnson Property, (c) 
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personal guarantees, and (d) pledge agreements securing the Note and the personal 
guarantees with the membership interests of Springs. [Id.] 
9. Neither the trust deed on the Anderson Property nor the mortgage on 
the Hulet Property (the "Hulet Mortgage") were signed or delivered at this time. 
Wilshire was informed that title issues on the Hulet Property were being resolved, 
but it was not informed at this time specifically why the trust deed on the Anderson 
Property had not been executed as promised by Springs. [Id.] 
10. On or about August 15, 2001, Mike Anderson and one or more 
representatives of Springs contacted Marc S. Jenson, CEO and Manager of 
Wilshire, and inquired whether the trust deed on the Anderson Property would be 
necessary to close the proposed loan. Mr. Jenson indicated that it would. Mr. 
Anderson then inquired whether, because the value of the Johnson Property and the 
Hulet Property was anticipated to be sufficient to secure repayment of the proposed 
loan, Wilshire could commit to foreclose on the Anderson Property only after 
foreclosing on two other properties and not receiving sufficient value from those 
foreclosures. Mr. Jenson indicated, contrary to the assertion of Petitioners' in 
Paragraph 4 of the Petition and Paragraph 6 of Petitioners' Memorandum, that, in 
the event of a default, Wilshire would need the ability to pursue remedies against 
10 
each of the properties as and when it saw fit and, accordingly, such an arrangement 
was not acceptable to Wilshire. [Id. at 145.] 
11. On or about August 15 or 16,2001, Petitioners' attorney, Ronald Ady, 
contacted Eric W. Pearson of Argue Pearson Harbison & Myers, LLP, 
transactional counsel to Wilshire, and made the same inquiry to Mr. Pearson as had 
been made to Mr. Jenson - i.e., whether Wilshire would agree to delay foreclosure 
on the Anderson Property until it had first proceeded against the other properties 
without success. Mr. Pearson indicated to Mr. Ady that Wilshire would not agree 
to this. [R. at 139.] 
12. Mr. Ady also inquired of Mr. Pearson at this time whether the 
Andersons could take a pledge of the membership interests of Springs that would 
be prior to the pledges granted in favor of Wilshire. Mr. Pearson responded that 
such a proposal would also not be acceptable to Wilshire and that if the proposed 
loan were to be funded at all, the terms of the loan and its security must be as 
indicated by Wilshire in its discretion, and that any further pledge of the 
membership interests of Springs would have to be approved in advance by 
Wilshire (in accordance with the terms of the executed pledges). [Id. at 138-39.] 
13. At no time did Wilshire or any of its representatives commit to or 
otherwise agree with the Andersons, verbally or otherwise, to (a) fund the 
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proposed loan with any specific amount of funds, or (b) to delay foreclosure on the 
Anderson Property until after it had pursued remedies against its other collateral. 
[R. at 145.] 
14. On August 21, 2002, Wilshire was informed that the Andersons had 
executed the trust deed securing the Note on the Anderson Property (the 
"Anderson Trust Deed") and had placed the Anderson Trust Deed in escrow with 
Security Title & Abstract Company ("Security Title") in Provo. [Id.] 
15. As issues regarding title to the Hulet Property were then still being 
resolved, Wilshire placed $2,365,000 in escrow with Security Title pursuant to 
escrow instructions contained in a letter agreement dated August 21, 2001 (the 
"Original Escrow Instructions"). The Original Escrow Instructions provided that 
no funds were to be released to Springs or any other party until, among other 
things, (a) the trust deed on the Johnson Property and the Anderson Trust Deed had 
been executed and recorded, (b) the Hulet Mortgage had been executed and 
recorded, and (c) lender's title insurance policies had been issued (or Security Title 
would guarantee the issuance thereof) in favor of Wilshire with respect to those 
liens. [Id. at 144-45.] 
16. In Section 25 of the Anderson Trust Deed (R. at 37-46), Petitioners 
agreed and acknowledged specifically as follows: "... this Trust Deed is absolute 
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and unconditional, there are no conditions precedent to the effectiveness of this 
Trust Deed, and this Trust Deed is in full force and effect and is binding on [the 
Andersons] as of the date first set forth above, regardless of whether [Wilshire] 
obtains collateral or any guaranties from others or takes any other action 
contemplated by [the Andersons] or [Springs]." (emphasis added). [R. at 40; 144.] 
17. Later in the day on August 21, 2001, Springs requested that Wilshire 
waive the recordation of the Hulet Mortgage and authorize the release of some of 
the escrowed funds. Wilshire determined that it would and waived the recordation 
of the Hulet Mortgage and authorized release of funds pursuant to a second letter 
to Security Title dated August 21, 2002, which specifically provided that the other 
conditions and requirements of the Original Escrow Instructions remained 
effective. [R. at 144.] 
18. At no time did Wilshire or any of its representatives ever possess, 
sign, deliver or record the Anderson Trust Deed. [Id.] 
19. Moreover, Wilshire understood that the Anderson Trust Deed was 
placed in escrow with Security Title pursuant to escrow instructions that would 
presumably protect the interests of Anderson vis-a-vis Springs as the Andersons 
determined appropriate in their own discretion. As indicated in the Affidavit of R. 
Michael Anderson in support of the Petition, these escrow instructions were in fact 
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provided by Petitioners' attorney, Mr. Ady. In fact, as indicated in Exhibit H to 
that Affidavit, Mr. Ady instructed Security Title on behalf of the Andersons on 
August 24, 2001, as follows: 
"This will confirm the withdrawal of my instruction that you not 
proceed with the closing on the Andersons' Trust Deed to Wilshire 
Investments, LLC and the Trust Deed from [Springs] to the 
Andersons until you have confirmation from Pioneer Title in Idaho 
that the Andersons [sic] trust deed on the Idaho property has been 
recorded as instructed. Instead, you can - independent of the closing 
by Pioneer Title in Idaho -proceed with the recordation of the Trust 
Deeds to and from the Andersons on the real property located in 
Wasatch County.'" {emphasis added) 
[R. at 353; 143-44.] 
20. From August 22, 2001, to the present time, Wilshire has released and 
funded additional amounts to Springs, both through Security Title and otherwise, 
and has provided certain consulting services to Springs, and the obligation of 
Springs to pay Wilshire for the value of such funds and services is also evidenced 
by the Note. [R. at 143.] 
21. In late August of 2001, Wilshire began to suspect that Springs was not 
dealing in good faith with respect to its compliance with the terms of the loan 
documents and the completeness of its disclosures to Wilshire. These suspicions 
were later confirmed when Wilshire learned that, among other things, (a) Mr. 
Turcotte and Mr. Woodson had granted pledges of their membership interests in 
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Springs to the Andersons in direct violation of the pledge agreements they had 
signed with Wilshire, (b) Springs was planning to acquire the Hulet Property and 
grant a mortgage thereon in favor of the Andersons in violation of the proposed 
terms of the Hulet Mortgage, (c) Springs had not disclosed to Wilshire the 
existence of certain Environmental Protection Agency actions against the 
Andersons or other parties involving the Anderson Property, and (d) Springs had 
apparently granted a lien to the Andersons on the Johnson Property in violation of 
the terms of the loan documents. [Id. at 142-43.] 
22. The Note was due in November 2001. To date, Wilshire has received 
no payment on account of the Note. Although not required to do so by the terms of 
the loan documents, Wilshire notified Springs of its default under the Note and 
requested that Springs provide it with a letter acknowledging such default and the 
amount then owing. Springs provided such a letter dated January 25, 2002. [Id. at 
142.] 
23. Notwithstanding the defaults of Springs and its principals under the 
loan documents (and the notices regarding such defaults), Wilshire has determined 
to date that it has not yet been in its best interest to commence foreclosure 
proceedings against any of the collateral for the loan or enforcement proceedings 
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on the Note, but has expressly reserved the right to do so at any time in its sole 
discretion. [Id.] 
24. Wilshire's forbearance in this regard has been the result of, among 
other things, representations from Springs that Springs has received interest from 
potential buyers and/or lenders in connection with proposed transactions that 
would result in the repayment of Wilshire. Unfortunately, the assertion by the 
Andersons and their attorney Mr. Ady of the baseless claims set forth in the 
Petition has assisted in stifling most of such interest. [Id.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's finding of no wrongful lien in the 
present action and dismissal of the Andersons' Petition. Utah's Wrongful Lien Act 
specifically defines what constitutes a "wrongful lien." Under section 38-9-1(6) of 
the Act, a lien document that is signed by the real property owner is expressly 
excluded from the definition of "wrongful lien." The Andersons acknowledged 
signing the Deed of Trust in Wilshire's favor. 
The express provisions of Utah's Wrongful Lien Act also make clear that the 
Act is not designed to resolve disputes among parties regarding rights or interests 
in or to property, but rather to preclude individuals who are complete strangers to 
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and who have no rights in connection with a transaction involving real property 
from improperly recording liens on real property. Section 38-9-7(4) provides that 
A summary proceeding under this section [i.e., petition to nullify lien] is 
only to determine whether or not a document is a wrongful lien. The 
proceeding shall not determine any other property or legal rights of the 
parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). 
Upon determining that Wilshire's lien was not "wrongful" (because the Deed 
of Trust had been signed by the Andersons), the trial court properly refused to make 
any further declaration regarding the parties' property rights. Instead, at the time 
the trial court made its ruling it specifically held that its ruling only went to the 
issue of summary removal of the alleged wrongful lien and that the court's ruling in 
no way affected the Andersons' rights to pursue other legal remedies. 
Despite the trial court's well-reasoned application of the clear terms of the Act, 
the Andersons now make several nonsensical and misplaced arguments. 
First, the Andersons argue that the trial court failed to fulfill the requirement 
under the Act of determining whether the Trust Deed was expressly authorized by 
statute. The Andersons' argument fails to recognize that section 38-9-1(6), which 
defines "wrongful lien" for purposes of the Act, is written in the disjunctive. Section 
38-9-1(6) describes three separate and independent circumstances in which a lien is 
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not wrongful. Thus, the single fact that the Trust Deed was indisputably signed by 
the Andersons establishes that the lien at issue in this case was not wrongful. 
Next, the Andersons argue that the trial court's application of the Act ignores 
and renders "surplus" section 38-9-4(3) of the Act. By its express terms, section 38-
9-4(3) becomes operative if, and only if, the court determines that a lien is wrongful. 
Section 38-9-4(3) reads as follows: 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or caused 
to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-
9-1 in the office of the county recorder against real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
(Emphasis added). In the present action, the trial court properly found that the lien at 
issue was not wrongful. Accordingly, the provisions of section 38-9-4(3) are 
inapplicable. 
The Andersons also make the incredible argument that because Wilshire 
purportedly failed to present evidence rebutting the Andersons' factual averments 
at summary disposition, a representation that is false, Wilshire waived any defense 
to the Andersons' claim that the lien at issue was wrongful. In other words, the 
Andersons argue that this Court should enter summary judgment in their favor 
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based on the trial court's dismissal of their summary proceeding petition, despite 
the fact that the Andersons have never moved for summary judgment. This 
frivilous argument should be rejected for numerous reasons. First, the argument is 
procedurally flawed. While this Court may review de novo the trial court's 
dismissal of the Andersons' petition, the Andersons can point to no support for 
their position that the Court may therefore enter summary judgment in the 
Andersons' favor on facts allegedly not disputed at the summary proceeding. The 
Andersons never moved for summary judgment before the trial court. They are not 
now entitled to seek summary judgment on appeal. 
Second, contrary to the Andersons' assertion, Wilshire vigorously disputed 
significant portions of the Andersons' purported evidence in the summary 
proceedings before the trial court. Moreover, because the Andersons admitted that 
they signed the Trust Deed at issue there was simply no need to attempt to 
controvert all of the Andersons' allegations. In the context of the summary 
proceeding brought by the Andersons, the only evidence relevant to the issue of 
whether Wilshire's lien was wrongful is the Andersons' admission that they signed 
the allegedly wrongful trust deed. Thus, even if Wilshire had failed to controvert 
the Andersons' purported evidence, any such failure would have no effect on the 
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correctness of the trial court's ruling—nor would it entitle the Andersons to 
summary judgment on issues not before the trial court. 
Lastly, even if the Court could somehow grant summary judgment given the 
procedural posture of this case, a review of the evidence produced by the 
Andersons actually supports Wilshire's position. The language of the Trust Deed 
and written statements made by the Andersons' counsel demonstrate that the lien at 
issue is not wrongful. 
As a final point, Wilshire is entitled to recover the reasonable attorneys' fees 
it incurred in defending the Andersons' baseless Petition. The Andersons' 
arguments are meritless, inconsistent, contrary to the plan language of the 
Wrongful Lien Act and in complete disregard of the facts as established by the 
documents in evidence in this action. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(5)(c) provides that 
a court may award costs and attorneys' fees where a claim of lien is valid. 
Wilshire's lien is valid and it should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The Andersons claim that the trial court misinterpreted the Wrongful Lien 
Act (Utah Code Ann. §§38-9-1 - 38-9-7). The Andersons' attack on the trial court's 
ruling is a confusing mishmash of statutory analysis and irrelevant case discussion. 
The Andersons compound the confusion by asking the Court to make inferences and 
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draw conclusions in favor of the Andersons, despite disputes in the evidence. The 
Andersons offer this array of faulty legal analysis and unfounded and vigorously 
contested factual assertions in support of the conclusion that the trial court should 
have determined that the Trust Deed at issue was invalid and wrongfully recorded as 
a lien on the Andersons' property. The Andersons miscomprehend the the summary 
proceeding provisions of the Wrongful Lien Act. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
THE WRONGFUL LIEN ACT. 
The Wrongful Lien Act does not contemplate a trial on the merits; it provides 
instead for a summary proceeding. The Wrongful Lien Act expressly forbids a trial 
addressing the array of claims a party may assert: "A summary proceeding under this 
section [i.e., petition to nullify lien] is only to determine whether or not a document is 
a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property or legal 
rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party." Utah Code Ann. 
§38-9-7(4). 
The Andersons' Petition sought summary removal of the lien pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-7. The trial court simply found that the Andersons were not 
entitled to relief under the Wrongful Lien Act and therefore denied and dismissed 
that portion of the Andersons' Petition that asserted claims based on the alleged filing 
of a wrongful lien. The trial court did not prohibit the Andersons from filing a 
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complaint and asserting their claims, however frivolous those claims may be, against 
Wilshire or anyone else. 
The Wrongful Lien Act commences by defining a "wrongful lien" for 
purposes of the Act: 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a). . .; 
(b). . .; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property." 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). In this case, the Andersons do not 
dispute that they signed the Trust Deed that is the subject of their wrongful lien 
claim. Because the lien at issue is not wrongful under the Act, the trial court 
correctly denied the Anderson petition to nullify the lien. For purposes of whether 
the lien at issue should have been summarily removed, the inquiry should end there. 
Nevertheless, the Andersons present three arguments in an attempt to convince 
this Court that the plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act is somehow unclear. 
First, the Andersons mistakenly summarize Wilshire's argument as follows: 
"U.C.A. 38-9-l(6)(c) . . . supersedes all other terms in the Wrongful Lien Act . . . 
and provides the sole criteria for determining whether a trust deed is a wrongful 
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lien." Brief of Appellant at p. 20. Wilshire never argued that whether or not the 
owner of real property has signed a trust deed alleged to be wrongful amounts to 
the "sole criteria" for determining whether a trust deed is a wrongful lien. Rather, 
Wilshire argued, and the trial court agreed, that under the clear language of section 
38-9-l(6)(c), if an owner signs a trust deed, that is sufficient by itself to determine 
that the trust deed is not a wrongful lien. Subsection (c) is manifestly not the sole 
criteria for determining whether a document constitutes a wrongful lien, although it 
is one criteria. Subsections (a) and (b) provide two other independent criteria for 
making that determination. See Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6). In this case, 
subsection (c) applies and bars the Andersons' claim. 
The Andersons next argue that Wilshire's construction of the Wrongful Lien 
Act limits a court's review to the face of the trust deed, thereby negating U.C.A. 
38-9-l(6)(a), which requires that a trust deed be authorized by another state statute, 
and rendering moot section 38-9-l(6)'s purported reference to U.C.A. 57-1-19(3) 
(a trust deed must be supported by an underlying obligation). Brief of Appellant at 
p. 20. This argument is a complete red herring and demonstrates the Andersons' 
complete misunderstanding of the operation of Utah Code Ann §38-9-1(6). 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) describes three separate and independent 
circumstances in which a lien is not wrongful. Those circumstances are stated in the 
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disjunctive ("or"). If any of the three circumstances apply, the lien at issue is not 
"wrongful" for purposes of the Wrongful Lien Act. Wilshire has simply pointed out, 
and the trial court agreed, that one of the three circumstances in this case clearly 
applies (irrespective of whether the other two circumstances do or do not apply).1 
Whether or not subsection (a) applies is irrelevant in this case where subsection (c) 
clearly applies. As set forth above, because it is undisputed that the Andersons 
signed the Trust Deed, the lien at issue in this case is not a "wrongful lien" as that 
term is defined in section 38-9-l(6)(c) of the Wrongful Lien Act. 
Finally, the Andersons argue that Wilshire's construction of the Wrongful 
Lien Act: 
ignores and renders surplus [the incorporation by reference into §38-9-
1(6) of] the provisions in U.C.A. 38-9-4(3)(b) and (c) (imposing treble 
damages on lien claimants filing liens they know are groundless, 
contain a material misstatement or false claim) and in the result provides 
the sole criteria for finding a trust deed a wrongful lien. 
Brief of Appellants at p. 20. The Andersons again are wrong. Utah Code Ann. §38-
9-4(3) provides: 
1
 In fact, the trial court agreed that a second of the three circumstances also applies. 
The trial court specifically found that the Trust Deed "is expressly authorized by 
Utah Statute." R. at 305. 
2
 Moreover, subsection (a) clearly means that J/a document purporting to create a 
lien is expressly authorized by a state or federal statute, the lien the document creates 
is not wrongful. Subsection (a) nowhere requires that a trust deed must be authorized 
by a state statute, as the Andersons argue. 
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(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 
or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or caused 
to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-
9-1 in the office of the county recorder against real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(c) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) (emphasis added). Section 38-9-4(3) plainly provides 
specific civil penalties only for the filing of a "wrongful lien," The condition 
precedent for the application of Section 38-9-4(3) is the existence of a wrongful lien, 
as specifically defined in Section 38-9-1. If no wrongful lien exists, subsection (3) 
does not apply. The Andersons have it entirely backwards. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-
4(3) incorporates §38-9-1 and not the other way around. 
Section 38-9-4(3) imposes liability only if a wrongful lien has been filed and 
the person who files the lien knows or has reason to know the lien is wrongful, is 
groundless, or it contains a material misstatement or false claim. Nothing about the 
trial court's ruling or interpretation of what constitutes a wrongful lien as defined in 
the Wrongful Lien Act ignores, renders surplus, or removes independent significance 
from, any other provision of the Act. 
Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000), provides a hornbook 
example of the type of inquiry a court should make when determining whether a 
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lien is wrongful under the Act in a summary proceeding as in the present action. In 
Russell, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of plaintiffs' 
petition to clear title under section 38-9-7 of the Act. The lien at issue in Russell 
was a Notice of Interest filed against the property of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the 
Court first examined whether on its face the Notice of Interest qualified as one of 
the three exemptions set forth in Section 38-9-1(6). Upon finding that neither 
subsections (b) or (c) of Section 38-9-1(6) applied, the Court focused upon whether 
the Notice of Interest fell under the exception set out in subsection (a) (i.e., 
whether it was "expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute"). 
In order to determine whether the Notice of Interest was expressly 
authorized by a Utah or federal statute, the Court examined whether the defendants 
had a right to file a Notice of Interest under Utah Code Ann. §57-9-4, which 
requires that an individual must minimally "claim to have an interest in the land." 
Id. at 1247. The Court then noted that the determination of whether a defendants' 
interest is an interest in land or a contractual right is governed by the parties' 
agreement. Accordingly, the Court examined the agreement of the parties and 
found that under its clear, unambiguous language, the defendants did not have an 
interest in land. The Court, therefore, determined that the defendants could not 
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have a Notice of Interest under section 57-9-4 and affirmed the trial court's 
decision. The Court in Russell did not examine the truth of the contents of the 
Notice of Interest at issue. Instead, it merely examined the lien document to 
determine whether it indeed was expressly authorized by a state or federal statute. 
The Russell Court appropriately first examined the face of the lien document 
to determine whether it fit into one of the exemptions for a wrongful lien under 
§38-9-1(6). In the present action, unlike Russell, the lien at issue falls directly 
within the provision of subsection (c) (i.e., "signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the real property"). A court can make its 
determination under subsection (c) by merely examining the face of the document, 
which the trial court did in the present action. 
The language of the Wrongful Lien Act is unambiguous. The trial court 
interpreted and applied the Wrongful Lien Act properly and correctly declined to 
summarily remove the lien at issue. 
The Andersons also assert that "the court's failure to make factual findings in a 
proceeding where it must determine the validity of the obligation underlying the 
lien and under Rule 52(a) Ut.R.Civ.P. weigh the evidence to determine that 
validity, renders its decision erroneous." Brief of Appellants at p. 25. This 
assertion is both factually and legally incorrect. The trial court did enter findings 
and conclusions. See R. at 303-06 (Findings, Conclusions, and Order Dismissing 
Petitioners' Petition for Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration or New Trial). Moreover, under Rule 52, a court need not enter 
findings of facts and conclusions of law when it grants a motion. See, e.g., AMS Salt 
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H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE 
ANDERSONS' ALLEGED DISPOSITIVE UNCONTROVERTED 
FACTS. 
The Andersons also argue the trial court refused to consider their alleged 
"dispositive uncontroverted facts."4 This argument borders on the frivolous. In 
ruling on a particular matter before it, a trial court obviously need decide only those 
factual issues necessary to support its ruling. In this case, the trial court made two 
independent factual findings, either of which independently support the legal 
conclusion that the lien was not "wrongful" under the Wrongful Lien Act. See R. at 
303-306 (Findings, Conclusions, and Order Dismissing Petitioners' Petition for 
Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial 
(finding the Trust Deed at issue is authorized by Utah statute and the trust deed was 
signed by the owners of the real property to which the trust deed pertains)). 
Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997) 
(rejecting the argument that the trial court erred in not making findings of fact 
under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where the court granted partial 
summary judgment, holding "[a]s rule 52 itself states, "[t]he trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions . . ."); State v. 
Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984) (denial of a motion need not be accompanied by 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
4
 The Andersons' statement that their alleged facts in this action are 
"uncontroverted" is simply false. As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, 
Wilshire vigorously disputes the Andersons' factual assertions, many of which are 
absolutely contrary to the well-documented transaction that the Andersons seek to 
attack. 
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Findings beyond those actually made by the trial court would have 
contradicted the express language of section 38-9-7(4), which provides that in the 
context of a petition to nullify lien, which is what the Andersons sought, 
[a] summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether 
or not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not 
determine any other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict 
other legal remedies of any party. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4). 
The Andersons argue that as a result of the trial court's alleged refusal to 
consider their facts, the court disposed of their entire wrongful lien claim under Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). Brief of Appellants at p. 26. While Wilshire submits that the 
Andersons have no claims under section 38-9-4(3)(b) and (c) because, as a matter of 
law, the lien at issue is not "a wrongful lien as defined in section 38-9-1," which is a 
precondition to application of section 38-9-4(3)(a), (b), and/or (c), the trial court in 
fact made clear that its ruling only went to the issue of summary removal of the 
alleged wrongful lien. When the trial court issued its ruling at the conclusion of the 
second hearing in this matter, the court specifically stated as follows: "[A]s a 
conclusion of law [the Trust Deed] is not a wrongful lien and therefore the Court 
dismisses that portion of the Plaintiffs petition that asks for the Court to nullify the 
lien. It does not deal with the issues of 'quiet title.' It does not deal with the issue of 
potential monetary damages under section 38-9-4 if it [i.e., the Andersons] can prove 
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those other provisions that might subject the Respondent to civil liability." R. at 470 
(Transcript of July 17, 2002 Ruling). 
After the Andersons again objected to the proposed form of order following 
the second hearing in the matter, and the parties filed briefs with the trial court 
addressing the objections, the trial court issued a ruling stating that it had closely 
reviewed the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order and determined that they 
fairly reflected the trial court's ruling. The trial court stated it was executing 
the Findings, Conclusions and Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition for 
Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration or 
New Trial. The Court has stated at both hearings in this matter that the 
denial of their Petition to Nullify Lien in no manner affects their rights 
to pursue other legal remedies as set forth in Section 38-9-7(4) [sic] 
U.C.A. 
Addendum (Ruling dated August 19,2002). 
In this case, the trial court denied the relief the Andersons sought in the form 
of summary removal of an allegedly wrongful lien. That was the entire substance 
of the trial court's ruling. 
III. THE ANDERSONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THEIR UNDERLYING CLAIMS BASED ON THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THEIR SUMMARY 
PROCEEDING. 
The Andersons make the incredible argument that because Wilshire 
purportedly failed to dispute the facts alleged by the Andersons in their Petition, 
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Wilshire has waived its defense to the Andersons' claims (which were not at issue 
in the summary proceeding) and this Court can now enter summary judgment in 
the Andersons' favor on those claims. The Andersons argue: 
Because Wilshire failed to present evidence rebutting the Andersons' 
factual averments that are dispositive of their claims of wrongful lien, 
the rule in Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1982) . . . 
results in Wilshire's waiver of any such defense. 
Brief of Appellants at p. 28. In other words, the Andersons argue that this Court 
should enter summary judgment in their favor on their claims based on the trial 
court's dismissal of their summary proceeding petition, despite the fact that the 
Andersons have never moved for summary judgment. The Court should reject the 
Andersons' argument for numerous reasons. 
First, the Andersons' argument is procedurally flawed. Nothing in Utah law 
allows a party to seek summary judgment on appeal where that party never sought 
summary judgment below. The Andersons made their allegations in the context of 
a summary proceeding for a petition to nullify a lien under the Wrongful Lien Act. 
The Andersons have not filed any motion seeking summary judgment on their 
claims. While this Court may review de novo the trial court's dismissal of the 
Andersons' Petition, the law does not permit the Court to grant a summary 
judgment that was never sought and for which Wilshire was not allowed a 
response. 
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Second, the Andersons' argument relies on the false assertion that their 
evidence of wrongful lien was undisputed. In fact, as set forth above in the 
Statement of Facts, the Andersons' purported evidence were disputed in the 
summary proceedings before the trial court. Wilshire did not attempt to controvert 
all of the Andersons' myriad of purported factual allegations for at least two 
reasons. First, the Andersons imposed severe time limitations on Wilshire because 
they scheduled an expedited hearing. Second, and more important, the "evidence" 
alleged by the Andersons was largely irrelevant in the context of the summary 
proceeding. The Andersons admitted that they signed the Trust Deed at issue. 
There was no need to attempt to controvert all of the Andersons' allegations with 
that admission on record. The Andersons' admission that they signed the Trust 
Deed was the only evidence necessary for a proper determination by the trial court 
in the context of the summary proceeding. If the Andersons wish to move for 
summary judgment they should do so before the trial court not here on appeal. 
Finally, even if this Court were to determine that it could somehow entertain 
for the first time on appeal the Andersons' motion for summary judgment on their 
wrongful lien claim, the evidence produced by the Andersons actually supports 
Wilshire's position. In particular, several clear provisions in the Trust Deed and/or 
in correspondence from the Andersons' legal counsel demonstrate the complete 
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fallacy of the Andersons' claims of wrongful lien. The Trust Deed at issue 
specifically states: 
This Trust Deed is given for the purpose of securing (1) each 
and every obligation of Springs of St Moritz Resort, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company ("Borrower") . . . (2) the obligations of 
Borrower or Trustor [defined as, the Andersons] under any other 
document, instrument or agreement executed by Borrower or 
Trustor in favor of Beneficiary [defined as Wilshire] and referring 
to this Trust Deed . . ., and (3) the payment of all sums expended or 
advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, 
together with interest thereon as herein provided . . . including 
without limitation the obligations of Borrower under the Note and 
any Additional Agreement.... 
R. at 46 (Trust Deed at p. 1) (emphasis added). The Trust Deed further provides 
Wilshire with the rights normally and typically accorded a beneficiary under a 
deed of trust, and it contains the following concluding paragraph: 
25. The obligations of Trustor [the Andersons] hereunder 
are independent of the obligations of Borrower [the Springs], and a 
separate action or actions may be brought and prosecuted against 
Trustor whether or not action is brought against Borrower or any other 
person . . . . Trustor acknowledges that this Trust Deed is absolute 
and unconditional, there are no conditions precedent to the 
effectiveness of this Trust Deed, and this Trust Deed is in full force 
and effect and is binding on Trustor as of the date first set forth 
above, regardless of whether Beneficiary obtains collateral or any 
suaranties from others or takes any other action contemplated by 
Trustor or Borrower. . . . 
R. at 40 (Trust Deed at p. 7, \ 25) (emphasis added). 
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The frivolity of the Andersons' assertion that the recording of the Trust 
Deed was somehow tied to a closing of property in Idaho is made clear by the 
August 24, 2001 letter from the Andersons' own legal counsel: 
This will confirm the withdrawal of my instruction that you not 
proceed with the closing on the Andersons' Trust Deed to Wilshire 
Investments, LLC and the Trust Deed from [Springs] to the 
Andersons until you have confirmation from Pioneer Title in Idaho 
that the Andersons [sic] trust deed on the Idaho property has been 
recorded as instructed. Instead, you can - independent of the closing 
by Pioneer Title in Idaho -proceed with the recordation of the Trust 
Deeds to and from the Andersons on the real property located in 
Wasatch County, {emphasis added) 
R. at 353. 
The clear language of the Trust Deed and the letter from the Andersons' 
counsel reveal that the Andersons' claim that the Trust Deed constitutes a wrongful 
lien on the Andersons' Property is meritless. 
The Andersons also mischaracterize the Affidavit of Marc S. Jenson, ignore 
the Affidavit of Eric W. Pearson, and leap to the entirely unfounded conclusion 
that because Mr. Jenson purportedly did not expressly refute certain allegations by 
the Andersons, those allegations are established as true. The Andersons even go so 
far as to claim that by failing to refute any particular allegation made by the 
Andersons, Wilshire has made a "damning" admission. See Brief of Appellants at 
p. 29. 
34 
The Andersons' self-serving conclusions regarding the circumstances 
surrounding their execution of the Deed of Trust are disputed and meaningless in 
the context of this appeal. As set forth in detail in the Statement of Facts above, 
Wilshire did not wrongfully obtain delivery of the Trust Deed. In fact, Wilshire 
loaned significant sums of monies to an entity that had contracted with the 
Andersons to purchase or co-develop land under agreements that contemplated 
significant profit to the Andersons.5 Wilshire has yet to be repaid any of the 
several million dollars it loaned. 
The proper interpretation of the Wrongful Lien Act is discussed above. The 
evidence necessary to support the trial court's ruling is undisputed. The 
Andersons' claim that Wilshire has somehow failed to present evidence that there 
are no substantial grounds for review in the context of this appeal simply 
disregards reality. Were this an appeal after a full trial on the merits, the 
arguments conceivably might apply. Because this is an appeal from an order 
5
 The Andersons conveniently fail to inform the Court that one of the primary 
reasons the contemplated projects did not proceed as planned was that the 
Andersons had fraudulently misrepresented (or failed to disclose) material facts 
about their Midway property (including the existence of unremedied citations 
under and violations of federal environmental laws). Wilshire understands that 
Springs of St. Moritz has filed suit against the Andersons in the Fourth District 
Court complaining of the Andersons conduct in this regard. 
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denying summary relief, the Andersons' arguments have no merit and the cases 
they cite have no application whatsoever.6 
IV. WILSHIRE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(5).(c), provides: "If the 
Court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss the petition 
and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. . . ." The 
trial court reserved ruling on Wilshire's request for an award of costs and fees. See 
R. at 304. Few cases could present more appropriate circumstances for an award 
of attorney's fees and costs to a lien claimant than does this case. The Andersons' 
arguments are confusing, inconsistent, and contrary to the plan language of the 
Wrongful Lien Act. The Andersons' position also is contrary to the plain language 
of the documents giving rise to the lien at issue. Wilshire has incurred 
considerable expenses and attorney's fees defending itself against the Andersons' 
attempts to obtain summary removal of the lien at issue. Wilshire should be 
6
 The Andersons repeatedly extract a particular statement or legal principle from a 
case citation and then attempt to manipulate that statement or principle to "fit" the 
circumstances of this case. In each instance, the logical distance between the 
principle cited to the self-serving conclusion the Andersons attempt to draw is a 
quantum leap. Wilshire submits that the Andersons' attempts are misleading and 
inappropriate. None of the cases the Andersons cite deal with the issue before this 
Court - a court's refusal to summarily remove a lien under the expedited hearing 
procedures of the Wrongful Lien Act. 
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awarded costs and attorney's fees, as established by submission of an affidavit of 
costs and attorney's fees from Wilshire's legal counsel to the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of the Andersons' Petition to Nullify Lien. The Court also should award 
costs and attorneys' fees in Wilshire's favor. 
DATED thisS_ day of August, 2003. 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
Mark R James 
Mark li^Richards 
Attorneys for Appellee Wilshire 
Investments, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, this ? day of August, 2003, to 
the following: 
Ronald Ady 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
4th DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R MICHAEL ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILSHIRE DEVELOPMENT LLC, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No: 020500229 
Judge: DONALD J. EYRE 
Date: 08/09/2002 
Clerk: diannb 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court upon Petitioner's 
Objections to Respondent's Proposed Form of Order on Hearing before 
the Court on July 17, 2002. The Court has reviewed the pleadings 
both in support and in opposition to the objections. The Court has 
closely reviewed the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order and 
find that they do fairly reflect the decision of the Court at the 
hearing on July 17, 2002. The Court has this day executed the 
Findings, Conclusions and Order Dismissing Petitioner's Petition 
for Removal of Wrongful Lien and Denying Motion for Reconsideration 
or New Trial. The Court has stated at both hearings in this matter 
that the denial of their Petition to Nullify Lien in no matter 
affects their rights to pursue other legal remedies as set forth in 
Section 38-9-7(4) U.C.A. 
Page 1 
Case No: 020500229 
Date: Aug 09, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020500229 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail RONALD ADY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10 WEST 100 SOUTH, SUITE 425 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail MARK F JAMES 
ATTORNEY RES 
10 WEST BROADWAY 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this / w\ day of UUfatAh. 20J?. 
Page 2 ( las t ) 
